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Abstract
Alongside the state juvenile justice system, various forms of non-state justice pro‐
viders are strongly prevalent in Palestine. Although the state juvenile justice has
evolved into a modern system, it lacks adequate human, professional and infra‐
structural capacities to provide effective justice to all children. This field research
has identified key non-state justice providers in Palestine and reveals that they are
more accessible and speedy and also place more emphasis on peacemaking and rec‐
onciliation than the state justice system. It also reveals that in the processes of jus‐
tice dispensation, occasional violation of children’s rights takes place within some
of the male-dominated non-state justice providers. In order to minimise rights vio‐
lation, while capitalising on the restorative capacities of non-state justice provid‐
ers, a ‘hybrid model of juvenile justice in Palestine’ has been developed and is pro‐
posed. It is argued in this article that the ‘hybrid model’ not only promises to pro‐
vide a coherent framework of links between Palestinian state juvenile justice and
non-state justice providers, but also has the capacity to minimise rights violation
through proposed internal and external oversight mechanisms. It is further main‐
tained that translating the hybrid model into practice may result in the provision of
more accessible, inclusive and restorative juvenile justice to all children in Pales‐
tine.
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1. Introduction, context and methodology
Sociolegal literature indicates that different forms of informal non-state justice
and dispute resolution mechanisms are strongly prevalent in much of the devel‐
oping world (and in some developed countries) through which most disputes are
resolved outside the state’s justice system (Albrecht & Kyed, 2010; Houlihan &
Spencer, 2017; Kötter, Röder, Schupper & Wolfrum, 2015; The TLO, 2010; War‐
dak, Saba & Kazem, 2007; Wojkowska, 2006). The situation is very similar in Pal‐
estine, where provision for justice by informal institutions and mechanisms has
been prevalent historically and contemporarily (Barak & Abuarrah, 2014; Hope,
2017; Jaradat, 2014; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2012). In fact, informal justice
institutions in Palestine developed mainly as responses to colonial powers before
1948 (Institute of Law, 2006) and then to exclusionary practices exercised by
Israel against Palestinian people in the occupied territories (ESCWA, 2017; Shal‐
houb-Kevorkian, 2016; This Week in Palestine, 2017). According to a report by
the Terre des hommes Foundation (Tdh) (2016), reliance on non-state justice has
continued to be strong even after the formation of the Palestinian Authority
(PA), based on the Oslo accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation
and Israel. As it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the political com‐
plexities of what Palestine (or Palestinian territories) in the post-Oslo accords era
is, in this discussion it mainly refers to the PA-governed West Bank and the Hara‐
kat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas)-ruled Gaza Strip. Despite their close legal
and institutional similarities, the West Bank and Gaza have separate justice sys‐
tems, which are examined in Section 2 of this article.
The 50-year-old Israeli occupation of the West Bank, blockade of Gaza, exer‐
cise of exclusionary practices against Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the
denial of statehood (in a real sense of the term) to the Palestinian people preven‐
ted the development of viable state justice institutions. This is one of the main
reasons that informal justice institutions continue to provide an alternative to
what is commonly referred to as the state justice system in Palestine (Shalhoub &
Abdelbaqi, 2003). Accessibility, cost-effectiveness and the ‘restorativeness’ of
these institutions are other reasons that contribute to the continued use of infor‐
mal justice. According to Defence for Children International (2015), out of the
2,457 juvenile cases received by police in the West Bank in 2014, 491 were
resolved through conciliation and mediation. In fact, many more disputes were
resolved before they even reached the police (Traki, 2006). While it is difficult to
quantify data generated by the present qualitative study, it confirms that a large
proportion of both civil disputes and criminal offences are dealt with through
informal justice providers among Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem.
Because of a strong common ground between restorative justice and informal
justice (Braithwaite, 2014; Braithwaite & Strang, 2001), the latter is especially rel‐
evant to juvenile justice that emphasises minimisation of the labelling effects of
formal responses to lawbreaking by young people. In recent years, the relevance
of informal justice to juvenile justice in Palestine has been emphasised by both
national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as by
94 The International Journal of Restorative Justice 2019 vol. 2(1) pp. 93-117
doi: 10.5553/IJRJ/258908912019002001006
Restorative justice capacities in Middle Eastern culture and society
Palestinian state authorities in the West Bank. This emphasis is clearly reflected
in Article 23 of the 2016 Palestinian ‘Juvenile Protection Law’. Article 23 offers
opportunities to all stakeholders to deal with an offence through mediation and
conciliation processes that lie largely in the realm of informal justice. However,
the law does not provide mechanisms for how this provision is translated into
practice, and therefore two key questions have arisen. What happens to the medi‐
atory decisions by informal justice actors that are made totally outside the formal
state justice system? How can it be ensured that such decisions do not violate
human rights standards and Palestinian law and that they also complement the
state justice institutions?
It was in this context that Tdh organised a workshop entitled ‘Toward a
restorative and hybrid model of justice in Palestine’, which was conducted from 2
April to 6 April 2016 in Bethlehem, Palestine. Participants included representa‐
tives of Palestinian state justice institutions, the United Nations and national and
international NGOs. The focus of the workshop was to explore the applicability of
the ‘Hybrid Model of Justice System in Afghanistan’ to juvenile justice in Pales‐
tine – a topic that received much interest from most participants. It is important
to point out that the ‘hybrid model’ proposed in the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)-supported 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report com‐
bined informal local justice institutions – mainly jirga and shura – with the state
justice system and existing human rights institutions in Afghanistan (Wardak et
al, 2007). Despite initial opposition, the hybrid model and its findings have had a
tangible legal, social and cultural impact on the provision of more inclusive and
humane justice in Afghanistan (Houlihan & Spencer, 2017; Swenson, 2017;
USAID, 2013; Wardak, forthcoming 2019).
The workshop paved the way for conducting a field study of formal and infor‐
mal justice providers to children in Palestine and the possibility of developing a
hybrid model that linked the two within a coherent framework. With Tdh’s sup‐
port, this qualitative field research was conducted between March and June 2017
in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. As the target respondents in this
study involved different state, non-state and civil society institutions, purposive
and snowball sampling techniques were selected. Thus, consistent with the quali‐
tative and descriptive nature of this research and its sampling techniques,
unstructured and face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)
were conducted with various Palestinian state justice officials (prosecutors,
police, judges and others), officials from the Ministry of Social Development and
other relevant state institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, inter‐
views and FGDs were conducted with local elders and leaders involved in tradi‐
tional dispute resolution (including mukhtars and islah-men), women leaders, law‐
yers, civil society organisations and legal and religious scholars. 71 people partici‐
pated in the research, including 31 individual interviews in the West Bank, 14 in
Gaza and 3 in East Jerusalem, as well as 23 participants in 5 FGDs in the West
Bank. (A list of key individual interviewees with their functions appears at the
end of this article.) The qualitative data was collected in Arabic and translated
into English and then analysed in light of relevant literature and Palestinian law.
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Section 2 of this paper focuses on juvenile delinquency, the development of
the state juvenile justice system in Palestine and its current state. Section 3 is
based on some of the salient findings of this field research, where non-state jus‐
tice providers and their restorative justice capacities are examined. Based on an
analytical examination of the findings of this research – as well as relevant legal
and sociological literature on juvenile justice in Palestine – a hybrid model of juve‐
nile justice in Palestine is proposed and illustrated in Section 4.
2. Juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice
Owing to different regimes that ruled the country since 1917, the applicable law
in Palestine has been a mixture of various legal traditions. While the Ottoman
legislation was based on Sharia and the Civil Law tradition, legislation enacted by
Great Britain until 1948 was influenced by the Common Law tradition. The West
Bank and Gaza were once again subjected to the Civil Law-like tradition from
1948 to 1967 under Jordanian and Egyptian rule, respectively. After its military
occupation in 1967, Israel did not extend its legal system to Palestine and ruled
by previous laws, adding a series of military orders (Qafisheh, 2013). After the
establishment of the PA, the late President Arafat enacted Decree No. 1 of 20
May 1994, in which he proclaimed that all laws that had been passed before the
Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1967 would remain in force until amended or
integrated. President Arafat ruled by decrees until the establishment of the Pales‐
tinian Parliament in 1996. The parliament lasted until June 2007, when Hamas
took over Gaza, which led to the creation of two de facto governments seated in
Gaza and Ramallah (Muwatin, 2016).
From 2007 onwards, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas started to use
his constitutional power under Article 43 of the 2003 Amended Basic Law, which
gives the President the power to issue ‘decrees of necessity’ that take the effect of
law (Touqan, 2008). President Abbas, with the support of the Council of Minis‐
ters that acted in lieu of the parliament, has issued dozens of decrees for the West
Bank, including the 2016 Juvenile Protection Law (Karyouti & Kmiel, interview
on 10 May 2017). Hamas, on the other hand, ruled Gaza on the basis of enact‐
ments by its prime minister, ministers, police and other official bodies. In view of
the new Palestinian conciliation efforts, parliamentary life is expected to be
restored and unified legislation for both regions to begin to be passed. Mean‐
while, new developments with regard to juvenile justice in the West Bank and
Gaza have taken place. These developments are examined in Section 2.2 of this
article, but first it is important to take a brief look at juvenile delinquency, its
nature and ‘causes’ in Palestine.
2.1 Juvenile delinquency
The existing body of research on young people in Palestine focuses mainly on gen‐
eral social and behavioural problems, including unemployment, mental illness
and drug use as consequences of a long and continued Israeli occupation (UNFPA,
2017; UNODC, 2017). There is very little systematic research that focuses on
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juvenile delinquency and on what it involves in the Palestinian context. Although
the current field research focused mainly on juvenile justice, it nonetheless
touched on juvenile delinquency, its causes and perception in Palestinian society.
This research reveals that participants perceived juvenile delinquency in Pal‐
estine as acts that involved both criminal offences as well as the violation of social
and moral/religious norms. The categories of offences for which young people
were arrested both in the West Bank and in Gaza were almost identical: they
involved mainly theft/shoplifting, dispute/fighting, sexual harassment, indecent
assault, common bodily assault, burglary, drug use/dealing and sodomy/homo‐
sexuality. Respondents reported that it was rare for Palestinian youths to be
involved in murder (of a fellow Palestinian), or in serious organised crime. Very
few young people were reported to be arrested for grievous bodily harm, serious
sexual assault and armed robbery, which fall into the category of ‘felony’ under
Palestinian criminal law.
In all parts of Palestinian society, girls were reported by respondents in this
study as committing significantly fewer crimes than boys. This finding is consis‐
tent with comparative criminological literature on crime and gender/sex (Britton,
Jacobsen & Howard, 2017; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). While theft topped all
offences for both boys and girls, ‘acts against decency/dignity’, acts that ‘dishon‐
our families’, ‘immoral acts’ and ‘blackmailing’ were cited as examples of ‘delin‐
quency’ among girls. The first three categories mainly involved ‘befriending boys’,
‘interacting with bad people and/or going to bad places’, ‘dancing and smoking in
public places’; the last involved defaming other girls through malicious gossip –
primarily through social media. These socially constructed categories of ‘deviant’
acts applied more to girls than to boys. Importantly, these categories of ‘devi‐
ance’, and the more frequently committed less serious offences, were reported to
have currency in the wider Palestinian society, including East Jerusalem. As dis‐
cussed later in this article, most acts of juvenile crime and deviance were dealt
with through conciliation and mediation processes outside the state justice
system.
It is important to point out that for most ordinary people in Palestine, the
line between violation of social and moral norms (deviance) and criminal offences
(violation of criminal law) seems to be blurred: the interviews indicated that acts
against decency/dignity, acts that dishonour families and immoral acts were seen
both as social harms and crimes. However, as many of these acts do not have clear
legal definitions in Palestinian laws, it was difficult for state justice officials to
deal with them. Similarly, traditional male-dominated tribal and religious dispute
resolution bodies were not always well placed to deal with these acts in ways that
prioritised the ‘best interests of the child’. Increasing acknowledgement of the
limitations of both formal and informal justice providers has led human and chil‐
dren’s rights organisations operating in both Gaza and the West Bank to get
involved in the provision of justice to young people.
When asked about the causes of juvenile offending, respondents most fre‐
quently referred to the broader political and structural environment, created by
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza, as the main causes.
They said that it was this ‘strangulating environment’ that has led, in turn, to
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wider social and economic problems such as ‘de-development’, poverty, unem‐
ployment and provision of limited public services and recreational facilities to
Palestinian youths. Other factors that were seen by the respondents as leading to
criminal behaviour among youths included the erosion of some traditional family
structures, lack of piety, peer pressure, the influence of ‘bad’ friends and parental
criminality. A notable factor leading to youth crime was the use of children by
some adults to commit criminal acts, including theft and prostitution. Most
respondents agreed that juvenile delinquency in Gaza, the West Bank and East
Jerusalem arose from a host of interconnected factors related to the challenging
social conditions of everyday life. As an official from the Office of Reform and
Outreach in Gaza eloquently explained,
Most of the juvenile delinquency cases with which we are faced in Gaza –
unlike those in many other countries – are unorganised; they are spontane‐
ous crimes caused by poverty, density of population, lack of recreational
facilities, and congested social space where juveniles’ families have to live.
Unlike other Islamic countries where the young person can get outside home
for recreation, the Palestinian youth does not have anywhere to go to except
the street. And that is where he or she is encountered with specific situations
and persons, and this is how crime takes place spontaneously and opportun‐
istically […]’ (30 May 2017 interview).
Respondents identified most of the aforementioned structural ‘causes’ as mainly
responsible for both male and female juvenile delinquency in the West Bank,
Gaza and East Jerusalem. However, respondents also cited the influence of mod‐
ern means of communication and social media – especially ‘smart mobile phones’
and ‘Facebook’ – as well as the ‘influence of bad friends’ in the real and/or cyber
world as the main immediate factors behind female juvenile delinquency.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to fully explain juvenile delin‐
quency in Palestinian society, structural factors (economic blockade, occupation,
poverty, unemployment and population density) are likely to have weakened
some families and communities, and their social control mechanisms. Indeed,
comparative criminological literature has consistently shown links between struc‐
tural factors and juvenile delinquency (Box, 1983; Nilsson, Backman & Estrada,
2013). Comparative criminological literature also indicates that subcultures of
delinquency and peer pressure in the wider social environment – alongside struc‐
tural factors – are additional links in the chain of juvenile crime causation (Esben‐
sen & Maxson, 2012; Sutherland, 1974). However, as discussed in Section 3 of
this article, Palestinian society is strongly ‘communitarian’ and seems to be coun‐
teracting these criminogenic factors through close-knit tribal, religious and exten‐
ded family networks. This may be the main reason that little serious and organ‐
ised juvenile delinquency is reported or dealt with by justice institutions, whether
state or non-state.
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2.2 State juvenile justice system and its key institutional components
The State of Palestine became party to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 2014, and President Abbas, in 2016, enacted
Decree-Law No. 4 on juvenile offending and justice, entitled ‘Juvenile Protection
Law’ (hereinafter ‘the law’), which prompted reform of the entire state juvenile
justice system. The law, which came into force on 29 March 2016, incorporates all
provisions of the UNCRC with respect to children in conflict with the law. It pla‐
ces the ‘best interests of the child’ as a primary consideration in dealing with juve‐
nile rule breakers. The new law has increased the age of criminal responsibility
from 9 to 12 years and removed the possibility of life imprisonment and capital
punishment for crimes committed by anyone under 18 years of age. The law also
lays the foundations for a specialised juvenile justice system, including specialised
juvenile police, prosecution, courts and juvenile care institutions. The law clearly
regards children’s offences as a social – rather than a criminal – problem and
incorporates a range of alternatives to custody. As mentioned earlier, a very
important development in this area is Article 23 of the law, which opens possibili‐
ties for mediation in cases of misdemeanours and contraventions before initiat‐
ing a criminal file. This provision has a strong potential for the development of
more restorative justice-oriented juvenile legislation and policy in Palestine.
Although some provisions of the 2016 law are vague (Qafisheh, 2017) and
require by-laws (secondary procedural legislation) for their implementation, the
law nevertheless strongly emphasises the ‘best interests of the child’. This empha‐
sis has had an important institutional impact on the current formal juvenile jus‐
tice system, which comprises four key state institutions: the Ministry of Social
Development (MOSD), the juvenile police, prosecution and judiciary. Juvenile-
related issues are assigned primarily to MOSD, which is vested with the power to
enact instructions to execute the law (Article 66). Importantly, it is also in charge
of Child Protection Officers (CPOs) as well as juvenile care institutions. The CPOs
act across all stages of the juvenile justice chain: arrest, detention, investigation,
indictment, trial, rehabilitation and aftercare. They are there to assist judges and
prosecutors to understand the personal and social context of the child’s life on a
case-by-case basis. The prosecutor, or the judge, obtains a report from a CPO on
the juvenile’s personal circumstances, including family, performance in school
and health. However, in practice, judges often ignore social reports (Mansour &
Adi, 14 May 2017 interview). More importantly, there is a serious shortage of
CPOs in the West Bank (Mansour & Adi, 2016). As the juvenile court can no lon‐
ger convene without the presence of a CPO (Article 25), hiring more officers is
essential for the provision of justice. MOSD, however, lacks the financial resour‐
ces to appoint more CPOs (Abdelkhaleq, 17 May 2017 interview).
As mentioned earlier, the juvenile justice system in Gaza is different from
that in the West Bank. The Ministry of Social Affairs of Gaza does not currently
apply the 2016 Child Protection Law; it applies the 1937 Juvenile Offenders Ordi‐
nance alongside Decision No. 25 of 2013 and Decision No. 15 of 2014, issued by
the Attorney General of Gaza, according to Mutaz Daghmash, Director of the
Ministry’s Social Defence Unit (23 May 2017 interview). Many respondents were
critical of this situation and emphasised the need for a unified law for both Gaza
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and the West Bank. Meanwhile, the ‘Law on Conciliation in Criminal Matters’ was
passed in Gaza in 2017, which focuses on mediation and conciliation in juvenile
offences. According to Saed Abdoh, advisor to Gaza’s Attorney General, mecha‐
nisms for the application of the law are under way (29 May 2017 interview). In
practice, however, juvenile justice processes in Gaza resemble those in the West
Bank: Public Relations Officers (PROs) in Gaza are involved at all stages of the
juvenile justice process, and it is the police station that first tries to resolve the
issue with parties through mediation involving tribal and religious bodies as well
as NGOs. It is only when mediation efforts fail that the case is forwarded to the
prosecution department and to the court.
Children have specialised police units under the 2016 law in the West Bank,
as stipulated in Article 15, and this has led to the de facto existence of juvenile
police over the past few years. In 2014, however, the juvenile police were merged
with the ‘Family and Juvenile Protection Unit’ (Defence for Children Interna‐
tional, 2015: 36-37). The new law turned the presence of juvenile police into a de
jure existence (Muammar, 8 May 2017 interview). The law underlined the state’s
obligation to provide children, upon arrest, with sociopsychological support. Also,
Article 18 prescribed that if the child is arrested, the police should notify the
child’s guardian and his or her protection officer. Police may detain a child for a
maximum of 24 hours before transferring him or her to the prosecution depart‐
ment (Khattab, 25 May 2017 interview).
The 2016 law also created, for the first time ever, a juvenile prosecution
department (Barak, 12 May 2017 interview). In 2017, towards a fuller realisation
of the department’s specialisation, 33 new juvenile prosecutors were appointed
(Khalil, 8 May 2017 interview). It appears that the specialised juvenile prosecu‐
tion service has been moving rapidly towards institutionalisation, by assigning
trained prosecutors to work exclusively on juvenile cases and on developing sim‐
plified manuals catering to the special needs of children (Barak, 2009). However,
there is still a need to adopt a detailed procedural basis for juvenile prosecution
and to put in place a computerised case-management system, in order to create
effective coordination mechanisms between juvenile prosecutors, the police,
judges, CPOs, detention facilities and correctional institutions (Hmidan & Gab‐
boun, 14 May 2017 interview). As noted previously, the law empowered prosecu‐
tors to offer mediation in child cases if an agreement between the parties could be
reached (Article 23). However, in practice, there is very weak coordination
between prosecutors and the police (Awawdeh, 7 May 2017 interview). In fact,
mediation work is conducted mainly in the police station, a practice that has had
strong support from most respondents in this study.
Furthermore, the 2016 law set legal foundations for the establishment of
specialised juvenile courts with full-time judges (Article 24). The law prescribes
that juvenile court hearings are convened at different locations and times than
those of adults. However, in practice, there is no separation between children and
adults at the court of justice (Mansour & Adi, 14 May 2017 interview). More
importantly, children are often handcuffed and detained for long periods – up to
1 or 2 years – before a final trial. Children are victimised within the slow juvenile
judicial process (Salaymeh, Qasrawi, Sharif & Imam, 8 May 2017 interview).
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Judges treat children as criminals, and courts are overcrowded. Indeed, juvenile
courts urgently need separate physical infrastructure (Shadid, Dana & Abuayyash,
15 May 2017 interview). Even though at least one judge has been recently
assigned as a juvenile judge on a full-time basis in each district in the West Bank,
these judges lack adequate and specialist training. The Judicial Training Institute
has recently developed a manual designed primarily for the training of juvenile
judges (Alsalamat, Ajlouni, Khalil, Misleh & Sawalha, 2017). It is important to
point out that the present research indicates that the state of the judiciary in
Gaza is similar – at best – to that in the West Bank. There are no specialist juve‐
nile judges in the strip, and only a few judges in ordinary civil courts. The existing
legal and procedural provisions relating to young offenders are outdated and/or
not implemented.
Finally, there is a chronic shortage of juvenile care institutions in both the
West Bank and Gaza: Dar Al-Amal (‘House of Hope’), for boys, and the ‘Girls Care
House’, for girls, are the only juvenile care institutions operating in the West
Bank. There are no juvenile care institutions for girls in Gaza at all; Dar Al-Rabie
(‘House of Spring’) is the only juvenile care institution for boys in the entire strip.
However, Dar Al-Rabie requires essential refurbishment and is in urgent need of
specialised staff and financial support (Aburamadan, 10 May 2017 interview). In
other districts, children in trouble with the law end up in police detention centres
for prolonged periods (Kozmar, 8 May 2017 interview). It is important to men‐
tion that each of the three juvenile care institutions can absorb up to 20 juveniles
at a time. The Girls Care House in Bethlehem has a mandate to host girls in con‐
flict with the law. However, the number of girls in formal care institutions is
reported as being low (Iskandar, 25 May 2017 interview), as most female cases
are resolved through conciliation within (extended) families (Taweel, Hiemouni &
Imam, 7 May 2017 interview). The House’s employees work mainly as teachers,
social workers and psychologists at other institutions (Michael, 24 May 2017
interview).
The foregoing discussion clearly shows serious problems in the state juvenile
system in the West Bank and Gaza in providing justice to young girls and boys.
These problems are fundamentally related to the prevention of the development
of a viable Palestinian state by the illegal 50-year-long Israeli occupation of the
country. Alongside this and the ‘de-development’ of the state juvenile system, his‐
torical, cultural and political factors further drive people to seek justice outside
formal state justice institutions in occupied Palestine.
3. Restorative justice capacities in Middle Eastern culture and society
Unlike a retributive justice philosophy, where crime is viewed as a violation of
state law punishable by the state, restorative justice views it largely as a social
harm that involves multiple stakeholders: mainly, the victim, society/community
and the offender. It follows that the victim, offender, their social networks and
the community, as well as the state’s justice institutions can deal with offences
collectively. Restorative justice can be viewed as a referral alternative in itself or
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used along with other alternatives to physical penalty (Braithwaite, 2000; Doolin,
2007; Hill, 2008; Meier, 1998; Schmid, 2003). In the systems where restorative
justice is used for juveniles, it is considered to be an alternative to the formal
state justice, but not the only one. It could apply to certain offences but not to all.
It may work for certain people, but not for everyone (Roach, 2000). Hence,
depending on the offence and the parties involved, juvenile cases might be refer‐
red to restorative justice programmes at any stage of the formal proceedings.
Indeed, restorative justice programmes often complement retributive juvenile
justice systems.
Central to the values of restorative justice is that restoration is arrived at vol‐
untarily through the active participation of all key stakeholders in an offence
(Johnstone, 2002; Zehr, 2015). It is also central to restorative justice that restor‐
ative outcomes involve collectively agreed obligations with a view to reintegrating
both offenders and victims into society (Braithwaite, 1989; Van Ness & Strong,
2014). While these values are central to the modern idea of restorative justice,
they are also deeply rooted in Middle Eastern culture and society, including
Islamic jurisprudence, traditional structures of authority and religious civil soci‐
ety. However, owing to the emphasis on community harmony, collective identity
and a shared sense of honour and shame in Middle Eastern society (Gilmore,
1987), many Western thinkers would not view all restorative justice mechanisms
and processes in the Middle East as restorative. Indeed, the heads of extended
families and sheikhs – rather than individual victims and offenders – often have
determining roles in the rituals and outcomes of specific dispute resolution pro‐
cesses. More importantly, women are generally excluded from active participation
in such processes, in which young people also have little say. Despite such cultur‐
ally relativistic differences, there are many strong areas of common ground
between Western and Middle Eastern conceptions and practices of restorative
justice. These are examined next.
3.1 Islamic jurisprudence
According to Rahami (2007), the seeds of restorative justice are deeply embedded
in Middle Eastern cultures and in the Islamic legal tradition. In the Islamic legal
tradition, the idea of restorative justice, including pardon and blood compensa‐
tion, are well-established concepts and used in some predominantly Muslim soci‐
eties, including Palestine (Traki, 2006). In Islamic jurisprudence, pardon and con‐
ciliation are strongly emphasised in criminal cases (Ouda, 2010). Very impor‐
tantly, Islamic jurisprudence covers almost all forms of alternatives to (original)
penalties that are proposed by and practised in modern restorative justice pro‐
cesses. Muslim jurists have extensively discussed the practices of blood compen‐
sation (diya), conciliation and peacemaking (solh), pardon (afou) and apology
(Rahami, 2007). They have also placed emphasis on community service (service
for the benefit of the victim), warning, fining, probation and reintegration of
offenders into the community (Qafisheh, 2012). Moreover, these jurists have
added unique mechanisms derived from the general principles of Islam that can
be regarded as restorative – such as repentance, giving ‘benefit of the doubt’, pre‐
serving privacy (satr), intercession (shafaa), surety (kafala) and expiation (kafara)
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(Qafisheh, 2012). The adoption of these tools and mechanisms reveals that pen‐
alty is not meant per se in Islamic penal jurisprudence. If offences could be dealt
with satisfactorily and offenders rehabilitated by means other than the applica‐
tion of penalties, the original aims of punishment are achieved. In all these pro‐
cesses, the victim has a central place: he or she is always provided with the possi‐
bility of getting an effective remedy and his or her relations with the offender and
the society restored (Qafisheh, 2012). Thus, a restorative justice-oriented model
is strongly emphasised in Islamic penal jurisprudence – either in its own right or
alongside retributive justice mechanisms.
Although the term ‘restorative justice’ in its modern conceptualisation is not
used explicitly in Islamic jurisprudence, by looking at the philosophy underlying
penalties and at the alternatives provided to original punishments, it can be
safely concluded that Islamic justice is primarily restorative. In fact, restorative
justice in Islamic jurisprudence is the rule, and retributive justice is the exception
(Qafisheh, 2012; Rahami, 2007). Indeed, as the long history of Islamic legal prac‐
tices throughout the Muslim world indicates, severe punishments ‘are considered
as just as preventive/deterrent instruments rather than being considered as an
actual punishment for implementation’ (Rahami, 2007: 241).
Restorative justice comes not only from the Quran and Prophet Mohammad’s
practices and sayings, but also from local pre-Islamic indigenous traditions.
Indeed, Islam has endorsed and adopted specific pre-Islamic local traditions such
as the practice of hamalah (compensating victims by the community when the
offender cannot afford financial compensation). The idea and practice of hamalah
show that the society or community also has specific obligations to both victims
and offenders. All this would seem to indicate that Islamic jurisprudence has the
capacity to accept certain old and new human wisdom that is in line with its fun‐
damental tenets and the conditions of evolving human societies (Qafisheh,
2012). Indeed, Islamic jurisprudence could be part of the efforts towards develop‐
ing common global restorative justice standards (Braithwaite, 2007).
3.2 Traditional and tribal justice providers
As mentioned in the introduction, a host of both civil disputes and offences are
dealt with by non-state justice providers outside the state justice system, or in
some collaboration with it. This study found that one of the main categories that
provide this form of justice in Palestine is traditional and tribal justice providers
that are categorised in this research into makhateer, mosleheen and ‘tribal judges’.
This study further reveals that the most prevalent category of tribal and tradi‐
tional justice providers in Palestinian society are makhateer (plural of mukhtar).
The word mukhtar in Arabic means a selected or outstanding man endowed with
the power to exercise authority. Makhateer, therefore, are men of influence from
clans and extended families who possess what Weber (1964) refers to as ‘tradi‐
tional authority’ in resolving disputes and enforcing collectively achieved deci‐
sions. Makhateer resolve various types of local disputes and deal with different
offences including murder, assaults, sexual harassment, rape, theft and other
forms of violence. While most makhateer operate informally outside state institu‐
tions, some are registered with the Department of Tribes and Reform (Gaza) and
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with the Department of Tribal Affairs (the West Bank) within the Ministry of the
Interior. The latter category of makhateer provides crucial links between formal
and informal justice providers, mainly in urban areas. In many rural areas, how‐
ever, makhateer often use ‘village committees’ for resolving local disputes as well
as other local problems. Similarly, makhateer play an important role in informal
dispute resolution among Palestinians in East Jerusalem, where Israeli law is
imposed on them.
Similar to the functions and roles of makhateer are those of mosleheen (also
called islah-men or conciliators), who mainly operate in urban areas as male medi‐
ators and arbitrators. While makhateer and mosleheen are not necessarily exclusive
categories, members of the latter are often more educated individuals who are
fairly well versed in law and/or Islamic jurisprudence. Because of the solid basis of
‘islah’ in Islam, mosleheen tend to be affiliated with ulama (religious scholars) and/
or religious civil society organisations – especially in Gaza and East Jerusalem.
Furthermore, this study confirms that other clan/tribe-based non-state justice
providers in Palestine are tribal judges. These ‘judges’ are also men of influence
who usually have expertise in specific forms of disputes and use custom (urf) as a
guide in resolving them. Tribal judges are often selected as arbitrators by parties
to a dispute; the parties commit themselves socially and morally to abide by the
decisions made by a ‘tribal court’. Although most disputes referred to tribal judges
are civil, they also deal with offences. In the latter category of cases, these judges
play the role of conciliators. In this way, the roles and functions of tribal judges,
makhateer and mosleheen may overlap: they use conciliation, mediation, arbitra‐
tion and/or compensation – depending on the nature of a case – in the processes
of informal dispute resolution (Taweel, Hiemouni & Imam, 7 May 2017 inter‐
view).
One of the main practical mechanisms of tribal/traditional dispute resolution
throughout Palestine is atwa. The tradition of atwa is widely utilised, and it is
closely related to the notion of solh in Islam (Taweel, Hiemouni & Imam, 7 May
2017 interview). This involves a truce, or a conciliation agreement, reached
between a joint delegation representing the offender and victim’s family or tribe
in order to recognise the wrongdoing, show readiness to repair the damage
caused and to satisfy the victim and his or her family. Atwa is normally agreed
upon orally at a public session; it is also sometimes written and signed by the par‐
ties and conciliators as well as by witnesses and guarantors. It is often published
in newspapers to inform the public that a specific conflict between individuals,
families or tribes has been settled. As mentioned earlier, atwa and other decisions
made by these informal justice providers are, largely, non-binding legally as the
Prevention of Crime – Tribes and Factions – Ordinance (1935) does not provide a
meaningful legal framework for regulating them. Nevertheless, governors in Pal‐
estine have created ‘tribal units’ in their respective governorates that deal with
disputes and related issues (Jaradat, 2016). This is mainly because governors view
traditional or tribal non-state justice providers as playing an important role in
restoring and maintaining community harmony and in the prevention of violence
and revenge – especially in rural areas and in marginalised urban communities
(Barak & Abuarrah, 2014).
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In Gaza and in East Jerusalem, most respondents saw informal justice pro‐
viders not only as widely accessible, but also as fair and efficient. However, many
interviewees in the West Bank remarked that notwithstanding the positive out‐
come that can be generated from tribal or traditional justice, its decisions are
arbitrary and sometimes favour the stronger party to a dispute. State justice offi‐
cials and legal professionals also said that many mediators and arbitrators are
unqualified and reach decisions based on their ‘feelings’ and ‘sentiments’ (Salay‐
meh, Qasrawi, Sharif & Imam, 8 May 2017 interview). State justice officials
strongly emphasised that only minor juvenile crime could be dealt with infor‐
mally and that serious offences must be dealt with by the state justice system.
Furthermore, these mediators and arbitrators are usually men, whose decisions
sometimes violate the rights of women and children. This research reveals that
the number of mokhtarat (female traditional mediators/reconcilers) is very
limited throughout Palestinian society. Although Gaza has about a dozen mokh‐
tarat, there were only a few influential women in the West Bank who sometimes
played mediatory roles. Despite being few, these women (typically teachers or
headmistresses) play important behind-the-scenes and indirect roles in informal
dispute resolution.
Many respondents – in West Bank, Gaza and in East Jerusalem – agreed that
tribal and community leaders do not take the ‘best interests of the child’ into con‐
sideration in their decisions, but rather the interest of families, the wider com‐
munity and communal harmony. However, other respondents rejected this asser‐
tion as alien and ‘exported from the West’ by some NGOs, international consul‐
tants and Western-educated justice officials. As one mediator put it,
A juvenile wrong-doer’s family and tribe are more well-placed in knowing and
assessing his/her best interest than the so-called professionals. How could a
state official – who does his job for a salary – know more about a child’s best
interest and be more kind to him/her than his/her family and tribe members
with whom he/she has lived all his life? (Taweel, 30 July 2017 follow-up
interview).
Indeed, some comparative literature indicates that vulnerable children in care
institutions are sometimes abused by the very professionals who are there to care
for them: for example, Valerie Braithwaite (2015) argues that modern state-spon‐
sored child protection systems are characterised by oppression. Drawing on
Young’s work (1992: 180), according to whom oppression manifests through
exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence,
Braithwaite maintains that these manifestations are part and parcel of the state’s
child protection systems in developed societies, including Australia.
3.3 Religious and modern civil society justice providers
This study found that – alongside tribal or traditional civil society – different
‘modern’ and ‘religious’ civil society organisations in Palestine provide various
types of justice to adults and children outside the formal justice system. In some
cases, these organisations assist in the delivery of justice within the formal justice
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system. The most well-known religious civil society organisations in Gaza and
East Jerusalem were rabita committees affiliated with the Palestine Scholars Lea‐
gue (Rabtat Ulama Falastin). These committees provide mainly mediation and
arbitration services, in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence. A committee nor‐
mally comprises one mukhtar and about 30 registered arbitrators, who are usually
men. The arbitrators are often highly educated with backgrounds in civil and/or
Islamic law. The fact that Palestinian civil laws are based squarely on Islamic juris‐
prudence means that decisions of the rabita committees are more likely to be in
line with those of the state laws and judiciary. Thus, to a significant extent, rabita
committees fill the large gap with regard to justice provision; they are highly regar‐
ded and trusted (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2012). Rabita committees are gener‐
ally self-reliant as international aid organisations are hesitant to provide techni‐
cal or financial aid to them. This may be one reason that some respondents in
Gaza and East Jerusalem did not see international aid organisations in a positive
light, saying that they provide support only to secular Palestinian bodies and
NGOs. Indeed, Israel has imposed severe restrictions on the provision of aid by
international donors to religious civil society organisations in Palestine, viewing
them as affiliates or sympathisers of Hamas.
As religious civil society organisations in Palestine lack robust financial, tech‐
nical and logistical resources, modern civil society organisations – mainly in the
form of national and international NGOs – play significant roles in the provision,
monitoring and/or facilitation of mediation and arbitration services. This study
found that there are currently three types of modern civil society organisations
working in the juvenile justice sector in Palestine: (1) organisations that provide
legal aid to juveniles in conflict with the law; (2) organisations that train and con‐
tribute to the capacity building of juvenile justice actors; and (3) organisations
and associations that take care of juveniles to which children are referred (Office
of Attorney General Juvenile Prosecution Unit, 2017). Examples of the first cate‐
gory are the International Legal Foundation and Defence for Children Interna‐
tional (DCI). Various other NGOs are known as primary capacity building provid‐
ers to juvenile justice officials through technical assistance: training programmes,
research, bringing experts from other countries for technical support, developing
procedural manuals and taking part in policy development. The work of DCI and
Tdh in this sphere has been especially commended by many respondents. Some
NGOs have, indeed, expressed interest – as a matter of principle – in hosting vul‐
nerable juveniles among other child residents that they currently support
(Michael, 24 May 2017 interview). Others are already hosting such juveniles
under ‘social need’ cases (Bakri, 9 May 2017 interview; Said, 24 May 2017 inter‐
view).
While some interlocutors opposed the involvement of NGOs in juvenile jus‐
tice, most were in favour of their engagement. Opponents feared that NGO inter‐
vention in justice-related issues may complicate a case by emphasising human
rights ideals rather than ending conflicts in culturally sensitive and discreet ways
(Taweel, Hiemouni & Imam, 7 May 2017 interview). Moreover, others in this cat‐
egory thought that NGOs might not be well placed for mediation tasks owing to
their ‘remoteness’ from local communities as many are elite forums whose work
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is project based – and therefore elitist and unsustainable (Khattab, 25 May 2017
interview). However, most of those surveyed believe that NGOs are in strong
positions to play an influential role in juvenile mediation processes. They said
that NGOs might complement the work of CPOs (the West Bank) and PROs
(Gaza) in mediation processes. More importantly, NGOs could perform follow-up
tasks while juveniles are in care or rehabilitation institutions. Indeed, as Schwartz
(2004) argues, many NGO staff in Palestine have long contributed directly to
mediation processes at all levels: police, prosecution and courts help in the follow-
up rehabilitative processes. Thus, both religious and modern civil society organi‐
sations in Palestine play significant roles in the provision of justice to juveniles
outside the state justice system. However, there is little systematic and meaning‐
ful collaboration among these various civil society organisations, and between
these organisations and the state justice system.
4. Towards a hybrid model of juvenile justice in Palestine
4.1 Hybridity and forms of interaction between state and non-state justice
systems
The concept of ‘hybridity’ in the sociology of law and legal anthropology is closely
connected with ‘legal pluralism’ that Merry (1988: 870) referred to as ‘[…] a situa‐
tion in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field’. The
phrase ‘legal systems’ in this context also involves non-state ‘law-like’ systems
that coexist with the state legal system. However, the coexistence between state
and non-state justice/legal systems is often complex, and may also be conflictual.
For example, Swenson (2018: 3) categorises the coexistence and interaction
between state and non-state justice systems into four distinct archetypes: ‘(1)
combative; (2) competitive; (3) cooperative; and (4) complementary.’ Whereas in
a ‘combative’ situation, state and non-state systems are hostile to one another, in
‘competitive’ coexistence, according to Swenson (2018: 7) ‘[…] the state’s over‐
arching authority is not challenged but non-state actors retain substantial
autonomy […]’. However, in ‘cooperative’ coexistence, while the non-state justice
system retains significant autonomy, it recognises the state justice system’s gen‐
eral authority and is willing to work with it cooperatively. Finally, in the case of
‘complementary’ coexistence between state and non-state justice systems, Swen‐
son (2018: 7) observes that ‘[…] non-state is subordinated and structured by the
state because the state enjoys both the legitimacy to have its rule accepted and
the capacity to actually enforce its mandates’. The last form of coexistence is evi‐
dent even in many highly developed societies, where state legal systems provide
room for various forms of non-state alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
(Edwards, 1986; Stipanowich, 2004).
However, the four archetypes of coexistence between state and non-state jus‐
tice systems are not mutually exclusive and may – in different social, political and
economic situations – include elements from all the aforementioned four arche‐
types (Forsyth, 2009; Wardak et al., 2007). And when the coexistence of ‘legal
systems’ is not formally defined and/or is problematic, the need for institutional‐
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ised hybridisation between various ‘legal systems’ (or elements of them) arises.
According to Donlan (2011), legal and normative hybridity is increasingly a fea‐
ture of modern justice systems around the world, and Palestine is not an excep‐
tion. Thus, hybridity involving the blending of elements of various existing justice
systems for the development of a new more effective variation is needed with
regard to juvenile justice in Palestine.
What has been discussed in this article indicates that Palestinian tribal/tradi‐
tional and religious justice providers, while generally male dominated and patriar‐
chal, have vast restorative justice capacities that strongly emphasise reconcilia‐
tion and the reintegration of offenders into the community. As these capacities
are deeply rooted in culture and religion, Palestinian state justice officials have
often taken them into consideration in their decision-making. This provides some
links between state and non-state justice providers (Jaradat, Slibi & Jaradat, 7
May 2017 interview). These links are further recognised and cemented by Article
23 of the 2016 Juvenile Protection Law. All these facts clearly indicate that there
are well-established links between informal and formal state justice providers in
Palestine after a case reaches the police. However, no such links exist between the
two systems when disputes are resolved by non-state justice providers exclusively
outside the state justice system. This research reveals that it is in this latter situa‐
tion that the rights of children and other vulnerable groups are sometimes viola‐
ted. Furthermore, as there is no mechanism for channelling any information to
the state justice system about cases dealt with exclusively by non-state justice
providers, the state’s rehabilitation and reintegration services could not be pro‐
vided to all young persons. The fundamental question is how to develop effective
coordination among Palestinian state and non-state justice and human rights
institutions, in order to monitor informal justice processes, ensuring that chil‐
dren’s rights and domestic laws are safeguarded.
One way to answer this question is by linking Palestinian formal and infor‐
mal justice and human rights institutions within a coherent and mutually constit‐
utive hybrid framework. As mentioned earlier, on the basis of the analysis of field
data presented in this study, relevant literature and legal materials, a ‘hybrid
model of juvenile justice in Palestine’ was developed. This model is examined and
illustrated next.
4.2 A hybrid model of juvenile justice in Palestine
Before describing the proposed hybrid model of juvenile justice in Palestine, as
illustrated in Figure 1, it is important to recall that this study revealed that young
people in Palestine committed few ‘felonies’ (serious offences) under Palestinian
criminal law. Most were ‘misdemeanours’ and ‘contraventions’, which are classed
as less serious offences. Young people also committed various acts that were
viewed as ‘deviant’. These acts were described as acts against decency/dignity,
acts that dishonour families, and immoral acts. As these are general categories of
deviation from social and religious norms, they are not clearly defined and
addressed in Palestinian laws. The present field research indicates that while
these acts were committed by both girls and boys, it was mainly young females’
acts that were viewed as deviant and delinquent. Therefore, a new sociological
108 The International Journal of Restorative Justice 2019 vol. 2(1) pp. 93-117
doi: 10.5553/IJRJ/258908912019002001006
Restorative justice capacities in Middle Eastern culture and society
category, ‘morality/decency-related deviance’, has been added to the three legal
categories – felony, misdemeanours, and contraventions – in the context of the
proposed hybrid model.
As the state justice officials could not process cases of deviance officially, and
the male-dominated tribal and religious justice providers are not always well
placed to deal with them humanely, it is proposed that such cases are referred to
human/children’s rights organisations that play an important role in providing
justice in Palestine. Furthermore, specific forms of domestic violence – which are
defined legally but parties prefer them to be treated with confidentiality – could
also be dealt with by these organisations. As human/children’s rights organisa‐
tions are staffed with large numbers of qualified female staff, they are more likely
to understand girls’ deviance and deal with it humanely. In this process, these
organisations may need to seek the assistance of formal and informal justice pro‐
viders, as Figure 1 illustrates.
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Figure 1 A hybrid model of juvenile justice in Palestine
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As Figure 1 illustrates, when a domestic violence-related case is resolved in this
process by a professional children’s/human rights organisation to the full satis‐
faction of all key stakeholders, it may be forwarded to the juvenile court for regis‐
tration. In this situation, the registered decision reached in the context of a
professional non-state justice provider is to be legally binding; if parties to such
case opt not to formalise the decision, a satisfactory decision would be written in
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an unofficial agreement letter and signed by all key stakeholders (including the
guarantors). Most non-criminalised cases of ‘morality/decency-related deviance’
would also be treated unofficially in this way. Copies of the agreement are to be
given to each party to the case and a third retained by the children’s/human
rights organisation. Should the parties choose to make a verbal commitment to
abide by the demands of the agreed decision, this option must be fully respected.
However, if any party to a domestic violence-related case is not satisfied with the
decision, he or she would have the option to go to the police to process the case
formally.
With regard to the legal categories of offences – misdemeanours and contra‐
ventions – it has been shown in this article that people take them to both formal
and informal justice providers. It was also shown that when a case reaches police
stations, there exist established mechanisms of mediation in which the police,
prosecution, CPOs (West Bank), PROs (Gaza) and informal justice providers are
involved. These links between the state and non-state justice providers are fur‐
ther cemented by Article 23 of the Child Protection Law in the West Bank and by
the 2017 ‘Law on Conciliation in Criminal Matters’ in Gaza.
The key issue, however, is with cases that are not taken to the police station
at all, and are resolved exclusively by the male-dominated traditional/tribal and
religious justice providers. It is in this situation that children’s rights are some‐
times violated. Figure 1 illustrates that in order to prevent or minimise violation
of children’s rights, a decision made by an informal justice provider (mainly tradi‐
tional/tribal and religious) would need to be monitored and approved by a
human/children’s rights organisation – through direct representation at media‐
tion sessions or through correspondence – thereby making it eligible for registra‐
tion by the courts. Once a case is dealt with informally in this collaborative way,
the internally monitored and agreed decision would be forwarded to the juvenile
court for further (external) monitoring. If the court did not object to the decision,
it would be registered with it and would assume the status of a legally binding rul‐
ing; the ruling would be final and irrevocable. However, as Figure 1 illustrates,
when any of the key stakeholders is not satisfied with a decision made by an
informal justice provider, it could be referred to the police for processing in the
formal justice system. It is important to mention that both the internal oversight
provided by a human/children’s rights organisation and the external oversight by
the court are there to ensure that informal decisions/agreement reached within
traditional/tribal and religious justice providers are not in violation of children’s
rights and Palestinian laws.
As for felonies, they would fall exclusively within the state justice system’s
formal jurisdiction, as Figure 1 illustrates. Contrary to the logic of the proposed
hybrid model, Palestinian state justice officials strongly opposed the involvement
of informal justice providers in dealing with serious offences. They argued that
owing to the fragility of the Palestinian state operating under Israeli occupation,
it needs to exercise exclusive formal authority – through the application of state
law – in responding to felonies.
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, cases of felony in the context of the proposed
hybrid model are to be processed exclusively within the Palestinian state justice
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system; judicial rulings may result in acquittal, appeal, alternatives to detention,
correction/rehabilitation order, fine or other outcomes in accordance with appli‐
cable laws in the West Bank and Gaza. However, the personal/private right
aspects of felonies (haq-al-abd) could still be dealt with by informal justice provid‐
ers through the use of appropriate cultural tools – including compensation, par‐
don and apology – that are generally in line with modern ideas of restorative jus‐
tice.
In order to translate the proposed hybrid model fully into practice, by-laws
(or national policy) on the links between formal and informal juvenile justice sys‐
tems in Palestine would need to be developed on the basis of the insights of this
research. The legislation would also define the limits and scope of the proposed
internal and external oversight mechanisms mentioned earlier. However, it is
important to mention that the model and its related proposed secondary legisla‐
tion are applicable mainly in areas where basic state justice infrastructure exists.
Nevertheless, the legislation (or national policy) could guide informal justice pro‐
cesses and decision-making among Palestinians in East Jerusalem and other Arab
communities outside the Palestinian territories.
Finally, it is important to note that dealing with both juvenile delinquency
and deviance within the framework of the proposed hybrid model may produce
benefits beyond assisting in strengthening the Palestinian state’s authority
through the provision of more accessible, cost-effective, speedy and restorative
justice to all – girls and boys. The state’s multilevel engagement with traditional,
religious and modern civil society may also provide channels of communication
with ordinary people throughout this occupied but resilient society. Effective
communication, which plays an important role in social integration (Habermas,
1985), may further strengthen social solidarity among the people and assist in
the establishment of a unified Palestinian state that is more capable of providing
effective and restorative juvenile justice to all.
5. Conclusion
Palestine’s state juvenile justice system has been influenced by civil, common and
Islamic legal traditions in different phases of its development over the centuries.
The current system is drawn largely on modern lines, similarly to those of its
immediate Arab neighbours, especially Jordan and Egypt. However, the 2016 Pal‐
estinian Juvenile Protection Law – particularly its Article 23 on mediation –
opens the door to the new ideas of restorative justice. Alongside the evolution of
the state juvenile justice system, informal non-state justice institutions have
mainly continued their existence, initially as a response to colonial powers and
latterly in response to the illegal Israeli occupation that has prevented the devel‐
opment of an independent and viable Palestinian state. These institutions have
also developed because of their accessibility, speed and restorative justice capaci‐
ties, which have a strong emphasis on reconciliation, restoration of community
harmony and reintegration of wrongdoers into the community. While this field
study explores these restorative justice capacities of traditional, tribal and reli‐
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gious institutions, it also reveals that they exclude women. The role of a small
number of mokhtarat in informal justice provision in the West Bank and Gaza is
an important issue that calls for further research and requires the attention of
both national policymakers and international aid organisations. Moreover, tradi‐
tional, tribal and religious justice providers tend to prioritise communal harmony
over the ‘best interests of the child’. It is mainly this situation that results in occa‐
sional violation of children’s rights.
From the analysis of field data, relevant literature and laws, a hybrid model of
juvenile justice in Palestine has emerged. The proposed hybrid model, it is argued,
provides a coherent framework linking state justice and relevant traditional, reli‐
gious and modern civil society institutions in mutually constitutive ways as
checks and balances on each other. This article concludes that the hybrid model
proposes practical ways of translating Article 23 of the Palestinian Juvenile Pro‐
tection Law into practice. It also concludes that dealing with both juvenile delin‐
quency and deviance within the framework of the hybrid model promises to
strengthen the state’s authority through the provision of more accessible, cost-
effective, speedy and restorative justice to all children. This could also provide
channels of communications between the state, civil society and ordinary people
throughout the society and strengthen their social solidarity for the creation of
an independent and viable Palestinian state.
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